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Abstract -
 
Virtual Private Network framework provides Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, 
Authentication and Anti- Replay services to the packets travelling through the shared medium like 
Internet. With the latest Advancement in the technology, Internet is available to the users thru all 
means like Wireless networks, GPRS, Satellite. When the VPN user roams or switches from one 
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Abstract - Virtual Private Network framework provides 
Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Authentication and Anti-
Replay services to the packets travelling through the shared 
medium like Internet. With the latest Advancement in the 
technology, Internet is available to the users thru all means like 
Wireless networks, GPRS, Satellite. When the VPN user roams 
or switches from one network to other, the IP address gets 
changed and VPN connection is tear down. The user has to 
again initiate the VPN connection whenever the network is 
switched. This paper present outcome of research project 
aimed at solving the mobility problems faced by roaming VPN 
users. 
Keywords : VPN, IPsec, AH, ESP, authentication 
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I. Introduction 
P packets doesn’t have any security when they travel 
through shared medium like internet. It needs security 
services like Confidentiality, Integrity, Authentication 
[6, 7]. Confidentiality is provided by encryption 
algorithms like DES, 3DES, AES. Integrity is provided by 
Hash Algorithms like MD5, SHA-1, SHA-2. 
Authentication is provided by preshared key mechanism 
or by using public key infrastructure like RSA (Rivest 
Shamir-Adleman) [8, 12]. These services are provided 
by maintaining shared state between the source and the 
destination of an IP datagram.  
The protocol to establish this state dynamically 
is “Internet Key Exchange (IKE)” [1, 2]. IKE performs 
mutual authentication between two parties and 
establishes an IKE security association (SA) that 
includes shared secret information that can be used to 
efficiently establish SAs for Encapsulating Security 
Payload [ESP] or Authentication Header [AH] and a set 
of cryptographic algorithms to be used by the SAs to 
protect the traffic that they carry[1, 2]. 
II. VPNS, IKEV2 
All IKE communications consist of pairs of 
messages: a request and are sponse. The pair is called 
an "exchange" and is sometimes called a "request/-
response pair" [1]. The first exchanges of messages 
establishing an IKE SA are called the IKE_SA_INIT and 
IKE_AUTH exchanges; subsequent IKE exchanges are 
called the CREATE_CHILD_SA or INFORMATIONAL 
exchanges  [2].  In  the  common  case, there is a single  
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IKE_SA_INIT exchange and a single IKE_AUTH 
exchange (a total of four messages) to establish the IKE 
SA and the first Child SA. 
The first exchange of an IKE session, 
IKE_SA_INIT, negotiates security parameters for the IKE 
SA, sends nonces and sends Diffie-Hellman values [2]. 
The second exchange, IKE_AUTH, transmits 
identities, proves knowledge of the secrets 
corresponding to the two identities and sets up an SA 
for the first (and often only) AH or ESP Child SA (unless 
there is failure setting up the AH or ESP Child SA, in 
which case the IKE SA is still established without the 
Child SA) [2]. 
The types of subsequent exchanges are 
CREATE_CHILD_SA (which creates a Child SA) and 
INFORMATIONAL (which deletes an SA, reports error 
conditions, or does other housekeeping) [2]. Every 
request requires are sponse. An INFORMATIONAL 
request with no payloads (other than the empty 
Encrypted payload required by the syntax) is commonly 
used as a check for liveness. These subsequent 
exchanges cannot be used until the initial exchanges 
have completed [2]. 
a) Usage Scenarios 
i.
 
Security Gateway to Security Gateway in Tunnel 
Mode
  
IKE is used to negotiate ESP or AH SAs in a 
number of
 
different scenarios, each with its own special 
requirements.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1
 
: Security Gateway to Security Gateway Tunnel
 
In this scenario, neither endpoint of the IP 
connection
 
implements IPsec, but network nodes 
between them protect
 
traffic for part of the
 
way. 
Protection is transparent to the
 
end points and depends 
on
 
ordinary routing to send packets
 
through the tunnel 
endpoints for
 
processing. Each endpoint
 
would 
announce the set of addresses "behind" it, and packets
 
would be sent in tunnel mode where the inner IP header 
I 
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would contain the IP addresses of the actual end points 
[2]. 
ii. Endpoint-to-Endpoint Transport Mode 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 : Endpoint to Endpoint 
In this scenario, both endpoints of the IP 
connection implement IPsec, as required of hosts in 
[IPSECARCH]. Transport mode will commonly be used 
with no inner IP header. A single pair of addresses will 
be negotiated for packets to be protected by this SA. 
The seend points MAY implement application-layer 
access controls based on the IPsec authenticated 
identities of the participants [2]. 
iii. Endpoint to Security Gateway in Tunnel Mode  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3
 
: Endpoint to Security Gateway Tunnel
 
In this scenario, a protected endpoint (typically 
a portable
 
roaming computer) connects back to its 
corporate network
 
through an IPsec-protected tunnel. 
The packets will use tunnel
 
mode. On each packet from 
the protected endpoint, the outer
 
IP header will contain 
the source
 
IP address associated with its
 
current 
location (i.e., the address
 
that will get traffic routed to
 
the endpoint directly), while the
 
inner IP header will 
contain
 
the source IP address assigned by the
 
security 
gateway (i.e.,
 
the address that will get traffic routed to 
the security gateway
 
for forwarding to the endpoint). The 
outer
 
destination address
 
will always be that of the 
security gateway while the
 
inner
 
destination address will 
be the ultimate destination
 
for the
 
packet [2].
 
b)
 
Cryptographic Algorithm Negotiation
 
The payload type known as "SA" indicates a 
proposal for a set
 
of choices of IPsec protocols (IKE, 
ESP, or AH) for the SA as
 
well as cryptographic 
algorithms associated with each
 
protocol [8, 9].
 
An SA payload consists of one or more 
proposals. Each
 
proposal includes one protocol. Each 
protocol contains one or
 
more transforms --
 
each 
specifying a cryptographic algorithm.
 
Each transform 
contains
 
zero or more attributes (attributes are
 
needed 
only if the Transform ID does not completely specify
 
the 
cryptographic algorithm) [2, 8].
  
This hierarchical structure was designed to 
efficiently encode proposals for cryptographic suites 
when the number of supported suites is large because 
multiple values are acceptable for multiple transforms. 
The responder MUST choose a single suite, which may 
be any subset of the SA proposal following the rules 
below [9]. 
Each proposal contains one protocol. If a 
proposal is accepted, the SA response MUST contain 
the same protocol. The responder MUST accept a 
single proposal or reject them all and return an error. 
The error is given in a notification of type 
NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN [2, 9]. 
Each IPsec protocol proposal contains one or 
more transforms. Each transform contains a Transform 
Type. The accepted cryptographic suite MUST contain 
exactly one transform of each type included in the 
proposal [2]. For example: if an ESP proposal includes 
transforms ENCR_3DES, ENCR_AES w/key size 128, 
ENCR_AES w/key size 256, AUTH_HMAC_MD5, and 
AUTH_HMAC_SHA, the accepted suite MUST contain 
one of the ENCR_ transforms and one of the AUTH_ 
transforms. Thus, six combinations are acceptable       
[2, 8]. 
If an initiator proposes both normal ciphers with 
integrity protection as well as combined-mode ciphers, 
then two proposals are needed. One of the proposals 
includes the normal ciphers with the integrity algorithms 
for them and the other proposal includes all the 
combined-mode ciphers without the integrity algorithms 
(because combined-mode ciphers are not allowed to 
have any integrity algorithm other than "none") [2, 8]. 
c) The Initial Exchanges 
Communication using IKE always begins with 
IKE_SA_INIT and IKE_AUTH exchanges (known in IKEv1 
as Phase 1). These initial exchanges normally consist of 
four messages, though in some scenarios that number 
can grow. All communications using IKE consist of 
request/ response pairs. We'll describe the base 
exchange first, followed by variations. The first pair of 
messages (IKE_SA_INIT) negotiates cryptographic 
algorithms, exchange nonces, and do a Diffie-Hellman 
exchange [2]. 
The second pair of messages (IKE_AUTH) 
authenticate the previous messages, exchange 
identities and certificates and establish the first Child 
SA. Parts of these messages are encrypted and integrity 
protected with keys established through the 
IKE_SA_INIT exchange, so the identities are hidden from 
eavesdroppers and all fields in all the messages are 
authenticated. All messages following the initial 
exchange are cryptographically protected using the 
cryptographic algorithms and keys negotiated in the 
IKE_SA_INIT exchange [2]. 
All subsequent messages include an Encrypted 
payload, even if they are referred to in the text as 
Design and Implementation of Mobility for Virtual Private Network users
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"empty". For the CREATE_CHILD_SA, IKE_AUTH, or 
INFORMATIONAL exchanges, the message following 
the header is encrypted and the message including the 
header is integrity protected using the cryptographic 
algorithms negotiated for the IKE SA [2]. 
Every IKE message contains a Message ID as 
part of its fixed header. This Message ID is used to 
match up requests and responses and to identify 
retransmissions of messages [2]. 
In the following descriptions, the payloads 
contained in the message are indicated by names as 
listed below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 HDR contains the Security Parameter Indexes 
(SPIs), version
 
numbers, and flags of various sorts. The 
SAi1 payload states
 
the
 
cryptographic algorithms the 
initiator supports for the IKE
 
SA. The KE payload sends 
the initiator's Diffie-Hellman
 
value. Ni is the initiator's 
nonce [2].
  
 
 
 
 
The responder chooses a cryptographic suite 
from the initiator's offered choices and expresses that 
choice in the SAr1 payload, completes the Diffie-
Hellman exchange with the KEr payload, and sendsits 
nonce in the Nr payload [2]. 
d) The CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange 
The CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange is used to 
create new Child SAs and to rekey both IKE SAs and 
Child SAs. This exchange consists of a single 
request/response pair and some of its function was 
referred to as a Phase 2 exchange in IKEv1. It MAY be 
initiated by either end of the IKE SA after the initial 
exchanges are completed [2]. 
Either endpoint may initiate a 
CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange, so in this section the 
term initiator refers to the endpoint initiating this 
exchange [2]. If a CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange 
includes a KEi payload, at least one of the SA offers 
MUST include the Diffie-Hellman group of the KEi. The 
Diffie-Hellman group of the Kei MUST be an element of 
the group the initiator expects the responder to accept 
(additional Diffie-Hellman groups can be proposed). If 
the responder selects a proposal using a different Diffie-
Hellman group (other than NONE), the responder MUST 
reject the request and indicate its preferred Diffie- 
Hellman group in the INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD Notify 
payload. There are two octets of data associated with 
this notification: the accepted Diffie-Hellman group 
number in big endian order. In the case of such a 
rejection, the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange fails, and 
the initiator will probably retry the exchange with a Diffie-
Hellman proposal and KEi in the group that the 
responder gave in the INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD Notify 
payload [2]. 
The responder sends a NO_ADDITIONAL_SAS 
notification to indicate that a CREATE_CHILD_SA 
request is unacceptable because the responder is 
unwilling to accept any more Child SAs on this IKE SA. 
This notification can also be used to reject IKE SA rekey. 
Some minimal implementations may only accept a 
single Child SA setup in the context of an initial IKE 
exchange and reject any subsequent attempts to add 
more [2]. 
i. Creating New Child SAs with the CREATE_ 
CHILD_SA Exchange 
A Child SA may be created by sending a 
CREATE_CHILD_SA request. The CREATE_CHILD_SA 
request for creating a new Child SA is: 
 
 
 
 
 
The initiator sends SA offer(s) in the SA 
payload, a nonce in the Ni payload, optionally a Diffie-
Hellman value in the Kei payload, and the proposed 
Traffic Selectors for the proposed Child SA in the TSiand 
TSr payloads [2]. 
The CREATE_CHILD_SA response for creating 
a new Child SA is: 
 
 
 
 
 
The
 
responder replies (using the same 
Message ID to respond)
 
with the accepted offer in an 
SA payload, and a Diffie-Hellman value in the
 
KEr 
Design and Implementation of Mobility for Virtual Private Network users
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Notation    Payload
-----------------------------------------
AUTH        Authentication
CERT       Certificate
CERTREQ     Certificate Request
HDR         IKE header (not a payload)
IDi         Identification - Initiator
IDr         Identification - Responder
KE          Key Exchange
Ni, Nr      Nonce
SA          Security Association
TSi         Traffic Selector – Initiator
TSr         Traffic Selector – Responder
V           Vendor ID
The initial exchanges are as follows:
Initiator                        Responder
-------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni  -->
Initiator                        Responder
-------------------------------------------------------------------
<--  HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ]
Initiator                         Responder
-------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR, SK {SA, Ni, [KEi],
              TSi, TSr}  -->
Initiator                        Responder
-------------------------------------------------------------------
<--  HDR, SK {SA, Nr, [KEr],
                                         TSi, TSr}
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payload if KEi was included in the request and the 
selected cryptographic suite includes that group [2]. 
The Traffic Selectors for traffic to be sent on that 
SA are specified in the TS payloads in the response, 
which may be a subset of what the initiator of the Child 
SA proposed [2]. 
III. IKEV2 MOBILITY (MOBIKE) 
IKEv2 is used for performing mutual 
authentication, as well
 
as
 
establishing and maintaining 
IPsec Security Associations
 
(SAs) [2, 3]. In the base 
IKEv2 protocol [IKEv2], the IKE
 
SAs and tunnel mode 
IPsec SAs are created implicitly
 
between the IP 
addresses that are used when the IKE_SA is
 
established. These IP addresses are then used as the 
outer
 
(tunnel header) addresses for tunnel mode IPsec 
packets
 
(transport mode IPsec SAs are beyond the 
scope of this
 
document). Currently, it is not possible to 
change these
 
addresses after the IKE_SA has been 
created [3].
 
There are scenarios where these IP addresses 
might change.
 
One
 
example is mobility: a host changes 
its point of network
 
attachment and receives a new IP 
address [3]. Another
 
example is a multi-homing host 
that would like to change to a different interface if, for 
instance, the currently used interface
 
stops working for 
some reason.
 
The main scenario for MOBIKE is enabling a 
remote access
 
VPN user to
 
move from one address to 
another without reestablishing
 
all security associations 
with the VPN gateway
 
[3]. For instance,
 
a user could 
start
 
from fixed Ethernet in the
 
office and then 
disconnect the laptop and move to the office's
 
wireless 
LAN. When the user leaves the office, the laptop
 
could 
start using General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); when
 
the user arrives home, the laptop could switch to the 
home
 
wireless LAN. MOBIKE updates only the outer 
(tunnel
 
header) addresses of IPsec SAs, and the 
addresses and other
 
traffic selectors used inside the 
tunnel stay unchanged. Thus,
 
mobility can be(mostly) 
invisible to applications and their
 
connections using the
 
VPN [2, 3].
 
MOBIKE allows both parties to have several 
addresses and
 
there are
 
up to N*M pairs of IP 
addresses that could potentially
 
be used. MOBIKE 
solves this problem by taking a simple
 
approach: the 
party
 
that initiated the IKE_SA (the "client" in a
 
remote 
access VPN
 
scenario) is responsible for deciding which
 
address pair is used for  the IPsec SAs and for 
collecting the
 
information it needs to make
 
this decision 
(such as determining
 
which address pairs work or do 
not
 
work). The other party
 
(the "gateway" in a remote 
access VPN
 
scenario) simply tells
 
the initiator
 
what 
addresses it has, but does
 
not update the
 
IPsec SAs 
until it receives a message from the
 
initiator to do
 
so.
 
This approach applies to the addresses in the 
IPsec SAs; in the IKE_SA case, the exchange initiator 
can decide which addresses are used [3]. 
A simple MOBIKE exchange in a mobile 
scenario is illustrated below.The notation is based on 
[IKEv2] [3]. 
Step 1 : Is the normal IKE_INIT exchange [2, 3]. 
Step 2 : The peers inform each other that they support 
MOBIKE [3]. 
Step 3 : The initiator notices a change in its own address 
and informs the responder about this by sending an 
INFORMATIONAL request containing the UPDATE_ 
SA_ADDRESSES notification [3]. The request is sent 
using the new IP address. At this point, it also starts to 
use the new address as a source address in its own 
outgoing ESP traffic. Upon receiving the UPDATE_ 
SA_ADDRESSES notification, the responder records the 
new address and, if it is required by policy, performs a 
return rout ability check of the address [3]. 
When this check (step 4) completes, the 
responder starts to use the new address as the 
destination for its outgoing ESP traffic. 
a) Protocol Exchanges 
i. Initial IKE Exchange 
The initiator is responsible for finding a working 
pair of addresses so that the initial IKE exchange can be 
carried out. Any information from MOBIKE extensions 
will only be available later, when the exchange has 
progressed far enough. Exactly how the addresses used 
for the initial exchange are discovered is beyond the 
scope of this specification; typical sources of 
information include local configuration and DNS [3]. If 
either or both of the peers have multiple addresses, 
some combinations may not work. Thus, the initiator 
SHOULD try various source and destination address 
combinations when retransmitting the IKE_SA_INIT 
request [3]. 
ii. Signaling Support for MOBIKE 
Implementations that wish to use MOBIKE for a 
particular IKE_SA MUST include a MOBIKE_ 
SUPPORTED notification in the IKE_AUTH exchange (in 
case of multiple IKE_AUTH exchanges, in the message 
containing the SA payload) [3]. 
iii. Initial Tunnel Header Addresses 
When an IPsec SA is created, the tunnel header 
IP addresses (and port, if doing UDP encapsulation) are 
taken from the IKE_SA, not the IP header of the IKEv2 
message requesting the IPsec SA. The addresses in the 
IKE_SA are initialized from the IP header of the first 
IKE_AUTH request [3]. 
iv. Additional Addresses 
Both the initiator and responder MAY include 
one or more ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS and/or 
ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS notifications in the IKE_ 
AUTH exchange (in case of multiple IKE_AUTH exch-
Design and Implementation of Mobility for Virtual Private Network users
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anges, in the message containing the SA payload). Here 
"ADDITIONAL_*_ADDRESS" means either an 
ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS or an ADDITIONAL_IP 
6_ADDRESS notification [3]. 
v. Changing Addresses in IPsec SAs 
In MOBIKE, the initiator decides what 
addresses are used in the IPsec SAs. That is, the 
responder does not normally update any IPsec SAs 
without receiving an explicit UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES 
request from the initiator. (As described below, the 
responder can, however, update the IKE_SA in some 
circumstances.) [3] 
IV. Conclusions 
The main goals of this research project are to 
maintain the security offered by usual IKEv2 procedures 
and to counter mobility-related threats in an appropriate 
manner. This section describes new security conside-
rations introduced by MOBIKE. 
1. Traffic Selector Authorization. 
2. Traffic Redirection and Hijacking. 
3. IPsec Payload Protection. 
4. Denial-of-Service Attacks against Third Parties. 
5. Spoofing Network Connectivity Indications. 
6. Performance tuning for support to Mobile devices 
like Smartphones, IPADS, Tablets. 
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